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CHAPTERt The Road to Glucksberg 
Carl E. Schneider 
This volume contains a series of essays on the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in Washington v Glucksberg, 1 the case that 
presented the question whether laws making it criminal to help a person 
commit suicide are unconstitutional. These essays are written by scholars in 
several disciplines for a broad audience that may include doctors, lawyers, 
ethicists, and the general public. In this opening chapter, therefore, I want 
to provide some background that might make these essays and the difficult 
legal issues they raise more accessible to such an audience. 
Before Glucksberg: Cruzan and Quinlan 
I begin, as a student of the common law must, with a case. In the earliest 
minutes of January 11, 1983, a twenty-five-year-old woman named Nancy 
Beth Cruzan was driving down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. Her 
car went off the road. When a policeman arrived, he found her lying face-
down in a ditch ten meters from her car. She was not breathing. Her heart 
had stopped. An ambulance quickly arrived. Minutes later, its medical team 
got Nancy's heart and breathing started again. But Nancy remained in a 
coma. 
As the days turned to weeks, it became clear that Nancy was in a "per-
sistent vegetative state. "2 Her brain had been deeply and permanently dam-
aged from being without oxygen for so long. She was unconscious, able only 
to respond reflexively to sounds and perhaps to pain. She lay curled up, her 
arms and legs contracted. She could not swallow. To make feeding her eas-
ier, her husband allowed surgeons to place a tube in her stomach through 
which she could be given food and water. 
Eventually, Nancy's husband seems to have left the picture, and it was 
her parents who heard the doctors predict her future. They were told that 
Nancy was not legally dead, since some parts of her brain still worked. Nor 
was she terminally ill. Indeed, she might live another thirty years. But she 
would never regain consciousness. 
On learning this, the Cruzans told the hospital to stop feeding Nancy 
through the tube so that she would die. The hospital refused to obey without 
a court order. A Missouri trial court issued that order, saying that Nancy 
would have wanted to die. However, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court. It found there was not enough evidence of what Nancy would 
have wanted to override the state's strong policy in favor of preserving life. In 
11 
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December of 1989-almost seven years after the accident-the case reached 
the United States Supreme Court. What should that court have done? 
This is really a remarkable question. The Supreme Court can generally 
decide for itself what cases to hear. It does not take most cases. This case 
might have seemed too easy a winner for Missouri to be worth reviewing. 
Nancy Cruzan did not fit many of the categories that are commonly invoked 
to justify stopping medical treatment. She wasn't dead; she was just kept alive 
by machines. She was not near death; on the contrary, she had many years to 
live. She was apparently not in pain, much less unbearable and unending 
pain. She had never used any of the formal means by which she could have 
announced in advance a wish to have medical treatment ended. She did not 
need "heroic measures" or "extraordinary means" to keep her alive. Indeed, 
she did not need medical care. She simply needed food and water. 
To understand how remarkable a question the Supreme Court pre-
sented itself with, we need one more fact about its jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court is, of course, the highest federal court. As such, its task is to 
resolve questions of federal law about which the lower federal courts dis-
agree. But federal law is not responsible for defining homicide or regulating 
medical care. That is the prerogative of the states. The Supreme Court could 
only reach the Cruzan case by considering an argument that Nancy Cruzan 
had rights under the federal Constitution that Missouri had somehow vio-
lated. Thus, the claim in Cruzan was not that good social policy justified 
withdrawing food and water from Nancy, but that she had a constitutional 
right to compel the hospital to stop feeding her. The claim, in short, was that 
she had a "right to die." 
How had America come this far? A few decades ago, things were quite 
different. Legally, of course, causing someone's death is punishable as homi-
cide, even if the victim consented. And helping someone commit suicide is a 
crime in about two-thirds of the states. It was generally understood that both 
principles applied to failures to provide or continue medical care a patient 
needed to stay alive. Socially, most people believed (without having thought 
much about it) that doctors were above all committed to keeping their pa-
tients alive. 
Nevertheless, in the real world of medical practice, things were more 
complicated. It was probably always true that, faced with particularly des-
perate cases, doctors deliberately let patients die. Indeed, hints would occa-
sionally slip out that a doctor had actively hastened a death. As medical tech-
nology developed, doctors increasingly faced genuinely confounding choices 
about whether to use medicine's whole armory. Eventually, it became ac-
cepted, although not invariable, practice to issue orders against trying to re-
vive an "irreversible, terminal, pain-ridden patient" when he stopped breath-
ing or suffered heart failure.3 
In short, the "law on the books" and the "law in action" were quite dif-
ferent. The law on the books said, "You must always treat a patient." But that 
law was often disobeyed. Prosecutors surely knew what was going on, but 
they rarely brought charges. Even when they did, the defendants were often 
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sympathetic, and juries were reluctant to convict and judges to punish 
them.4 Nevertheless, the very conflict between what the law said and what it 
did was widely criticized. Nor were doctors comfortable with either the 
moral or the legal risks they ran when they walked the line between the law 
on the books and the law in action. 
In sum, there was real uncertainty and ambivalence about the role of 
both law and medicine at the end of life. This ambivalence was captured in 
a case from 194 7-Repouille v United States. 5 Louis Repouille wanted to be-
come a naturalized citizen. To do so, he had to show that he had been a per-
son of "good moral character" for five years. However, he had had a thirteen-
year-old boy who was mentally retarded, mute, and blind; who had 
malformed arms and legs; who could do nothing for himself; and who lived 
out his life in a crib. Repouille found it hard to care for the boy and his four 
other children, and one day he chloroformed the child. Repouille was con-
victed of manslaughter, but he was given a suspended sentence. (That is, he 
was put on probation but did not have to go to jail.) Was he a person of "good 
moral character"? 
The court, in an opinion by Learned Hand, one of America's most ad-
mired judges, saw many moral perplexities but held "that only a minority of 
virtuous persons would deem the practise [of killing such a child) morally 
justifiable, while it remains in private hands, even when the provocation is as 
overwhelming as it was in this instance. "6 However, Judge Jerome Frank, 
another eminent jurist, dissented. Notably, he did not argue that Mr. Re-
pouille was a man of good moral character. Rather, he argued that the issue 
was so uncertain that the court should have sought information about the 
general public view of such conduct. 7 
Despite this ambivalence, or perhaps because of it, the law governing 
the end of life came under growing pressure. Medical advances multiplied 
questions about when to stop or withhold treatment. Doctors had ever more 
reason to fear both criminal and civil liability for decisions not to treat. Fur-
thermore, a small but convinced movement sought to liberalize the law. 
That movement was earnestly confident that the law was backward and bar-
baric, and it labored to reform it. Still, these issues were not broadly dis-
cussed, and the public remained uninformed, uncertain, and uneasy about 
the law at the end of life. 
The first major change in both public and legal attitudes came, of 
course, with a case. In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court encountered 
Karen Ann Quinlan.8 She was a twenty-two-year-old woman who had fallen 
into a persistent vegetative state. In other words, she lay in a coma from 
which doctors said she could not recover. She could not breathe on her own 
and was kept alive by a machine (called a respirator) that helped her 
breathe. She could not eat on her own and was fed by means of a tube. She 
was expected to die within a year, and possibly much sooner. 
After prayer and consultation with priests, Karen's father asked a court 
to appoint him his daughter's guardian and to let him have the respirator re-
moved so that she might die. The trial court said no, but the state supreme 
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court said yes. Citing Roe v Wade, the American abortion decision, the court 
held that patients have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. 
That right, the court continued, "should not be discarded solely on the basis 
that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice."9 It said 
that "[t]he only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit 
the guardian and family of Karen" to decide what she would have done had 
she been able to decide for herself.10 Since the court had "no doubt ... that 
if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval" she would not want 
the respirator, the court authorized her father to order its removal. 11 
Why was the Quinlan case crucial? As I suggested, it arose when the 
time was ripe, when the issue was becoming more common and more prob-
lematic. Karen Quinlan unforgettably embodied the reformers' claims. She 
was by all accounts a lively and engaging person harshly struck down. Her fa-
ther was by all accounts a decent, thoughtful, and devastated man struggling 
to do his best under the worst circumstances. Day after day, the Quinlans 
won the public's deepest attention and profoundest sympathy. Further, the 
case was importantly different from earlier causes celebres. They had typi-
cally involved prosecutions of people who had already taken the law into 
their own hands in a "mercy killing." But in Quinlan the family was respect-
fully asking for governmental authority to end their daughter's life. 
Ultimately, then, Quinlan legitimated discussion about the issues it 
raised. More, it confirmed the respectability of the Quinlans' position. And, 
in legal terms, it held not just that patients could refuse even lifesaving treat-
ment, but that they had a constitutional right to do so, a right that survived 
even their ability to exercise it. By phrasing the issue in constitutional terms 
at this early stage m public discussion, the court gave the reformer's position 
special moral and legal authority. 
Nevertheless, Quinlan did not liberalize the law as much as another case 
might have. First, its issue was whether to withhold medical care, not to with-
hold food and water or actively to kill the patient. Second, the medical care 
being withheld could have been called "extraordinary" or "heroic." Third, the 
court assumed that Karen Quinlan was dying anyway, so that the question 
could be not whether to cause her to die, but whether her death should be 
prolonged. 12 Finally, Quinlan's dramatic message was dulled by an ironic 
fact. When her father ordered the respirator removed, Karen Quinlan con-
founded the doctors by not dying. Indeed, she lived on for nine more years. 
Whatever Quinlan's direct effects, it initiated a period of vigorous legal 
activity and public discussion. A series of judicial decisions stated a "right to 
refuse treatment," even where that treatment had kept the patient alive. 
This right was both constitutional and based on the common law principle 
that a doctor could not treat a patient unless the patient gave "informed con-
sent." In 1976, the date of Quinlan, California enacted a law authorizing 
what came to be called "living wills." Living wills are documents in which a 
person states that, should he become irrevocably incompetent while fatally 
ill, his doctors should (under specified circumstances) withdraw any treat-
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ment designed to keep him alive. Some states have also created the "durable 
power of attorney." This document allows its signer to appoint someone to 
make medical decisions-including withdrawal of treatment-for him if he 
becomes incompetent. By 1990, forty states had enacted living will statutes, 
and thirteen permitted durable powers of attorney. 13 
These statutory developments dissatisfied many reformers because 
most people never use them. But where were the reformers to tum next? In 
the American federal system, the easiest way of getting national action is 
through a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, when Americans 
think about a social issue, they think in terms of rights. These facts brought 
the reform movement to the case with which I began, the case of Nancy 
Cruzan. Although Missouri provided for living wills, Nancy had not written 
one. Did she nevertheless have and exercise a constitutional "right to die"? 
A majority of the Supreme Court appears to have held in Cruzan that a 
competent person has a constitutional right to refuse "unwanted medical 
treatment."14 But, bya vote of five to four, the Court held that Missouri could 
prevent Nancy's parents from withdrawing treatment. The Court said that 
the constitutional right was a right to choose, and Nancy had never chosen 
to refuse treatment and now was physically incapable of making any kind of 
choice at all: "[A]n incompetent person," the Court said, "is not able to make 
an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse 
treatment or any other right."15 
The Court did seem to say that Nancy need not have expressed her 
choice formally, in a living will. But Missouri could insist that evidence of 
any informal choice be "clear and convincing." The evidence of Nancy's 
choice lay in a "'somewhat serious (1/2 hr.] conversation with a housemate 
friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless 
she could live at least halfway normally .... '" The United States Supreme 
Court agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court that this testimony was not 
clear and convincing evidence that Nancy would truly have wanted to be de-
nied food and water in her present circumstances. 
The majority's opinion provoked two angry dissents. Justice Brennan 
wrote for himself and two other Justices. He insisted that Nancy had a "fun-
damental right" to "be free from unwanted medical attention." This meant 
"a right to evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and its possible conse-
quences according to one's own values and to make a personal decision 
whether to subject oneself to the intrusion. "16 The fact "that Nancy Cruzan 
is now incompetent," Justice Brennan thought, could not "deprive her of her 
fundamental rights."17 True, she could not personally exerc,ise her right to 
"choose to die with dignity. "18 But the Court was constitutionally obliged to 
try to decipher what she would have done had she been conscious. And in 
doing so, it was obliged to look to all the available evidence, even if it was not 
"clear and convincing." 
Justice Stevens wrote a lone dissent. He agreed with Justice Brennan 
that Nancy had a fundamental right. But it was not, as the majority and Jus-
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tice Brennan believed, a right to choose. It was a right to a decision in her 
best interests. Since there was "no reasonable ground for believing that 
Nancy Beth Cruzan ha[d] any personal interest in the perpetuation of what 
the State has decided is her life,"19 her parents should have been allowed to 
order the hospital to stop feeding her. 
On its face, Cruzan appeared to be a setback for the reformers. After all, 
the Court decided against Nancy's parents. Nevertheless, on balance Cruzan 
has been a trumpet call in a crescendoing reform effort. Even though the 
Cruzans lost, the Court apparently announced some kind of constitutional 
"right to die." The Court thus opened the door to the prospect of a series of 
cases limiting the ability of the states to regulate law at the end of life. 
Further, like Quinlan, Cruzan has transformed public debate. Both 
cases received wide publicity. Both cases confronted the country with sym-
pathetic parents arguing in the most earnest and appealing terms to be al-
lowed to end their daughter's life. Of course, it is hard to measure the pub-
lic's feelings about these questions. But some indication may be found in the 
fact that a book on how to commit suicide was for months a best-seller. More 
systematically, Justice Brennan quoted a poll purporting to find "that 80% of 
those surveyed favored withdrawal of life support systems from hopelessly ill 
or irreversibly comatose patients if they or their families requested it. "20 
However, much depends on how pollsters phrase their questions. One 
regional poll found that 50 percent of those asked felt that "the Supreme 
Court should ... approve removal of the feeding tube" in Cruzan. But when 
asked whether "the Supreme Court should ... allow Ms. Cruzan to starve to 
death?" only 25 percent said yes.21 
The evolving public mood has had practical manifestations. Publicity 
about Cruzan "helped assure passage by Congress of the Patient Self-Deter-
mination Act .... "22 That law requires all health care institutions that re-
ceive federal aid to tell patients they have a right to refuse medical treatment 
and to employ advance medical directives like living wills and durable pow-
ers of attorney. But perhaps the most remarkable aftermath of Cruzan was 
the efflorescence of a movement to make it legal for doctors to help patients 
commit suicide. The remarkably rapid development in support for that 
movement is suggested by developments in the state of Washington. There, 
citizens can propose statutes and vote them directly into law. Initiative 119 
would have been the first statute in the industrialized world directly author-
izing doctors to kill patients who had less than six months to live and who 
had asked the doctor in writing to do so. 
Initiative 119 would arguably have passed except for one man in Michi-
gan. A week before the election, Dr. Jack Kevorkian met with two middle-
aged women in a cabin in a park outside of Detroit. He provided one of them 
with a machine he called a "mercytron." This machine allowed her to inject 
herself with a fatal drug. Kevorkian furnished the other woman with a way to 
breathe carbon monoxide and thus suffocate. As Kevorkian watched, both 
women killed themselves. 
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Kevorkian publicized this event with great avidity. But many people 
found him and his crusade frightening. He acted alone, without formally es-
tablished procedures for ensuring that the women had received adequate 
medical care, that they were competent, or that they truly and firmly wanted 
to die. Neither woman was fatally ill. One of them complained of incessant 
and unbearable pain, but at least one doctor later said that her disease was 
short-term, treatable, and should have caused only manageable pain. In 
short, Kevorkian was so much every patient's nightmare that he apparently 
shifted public opinion from its original 60 to 30 percent support of the pro-
posal to a 54 to 46 percent rejection ofit at the election.23 
Nevertheless, the fact that so substantial a portion of the population was 
willing to vote for so substantial a change in the law was striking. And this was 
only the beginning. In 1992, precisely the same percentage of the voters in a 
California referendum expressed a similar willingness. In 1994, the voters of 
Oregon approved a referendum by a vote of 51 to 49 percent that authorized 
doctors to prescribe drugs that competent, terminally ill patients could use to 
commit suicide. And in 1997, after the Oregon legislature had exercised its 
power to revoke the statute the voters had passed, the voters of Oregon voted 
once again for the proposal, this time by a vote of 60 to 40 percent. 
Particularly significant from our point of view is the number of courts 
that have announced some kind of constitutional defect in assisted-suicide 
statutes. In 1993, a Michigan trial court judge made such a ruling in a case 
involving Kevorkian,24 although the Michigan Supreme Court reversed that 
ruling in 1994. 25 In that same year a federal trial court in Washington found 
the Washington assisted-suicide statute unconstitutional.26 More signifi-
cantly, that decision was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in an 
en bane decision,27 and the Second Circuit found the New York assisted-
suicide statute unconstitutional.28 The two circuit court opinions used im-
portantly different reasoning. The Ninth Circuit found in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a "liberty interest in determining the 
time and manner of one's own death"29 and concluded none of the state's in-
terests was sufficiently strong to overcome that liberty interest. The Second 
Circuit held that the New York statute violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause requires that similarly situated 
people be treated similarly. The court reasoned that all terminally ill people 
are similarly situated but that, under New York law, they were treated dif-
ferently: terminally ill people who were kept alive with medical help could 
die by refusing that help while terminally ill people who did not need such 
help could not die by refusing it. 
The United States Supreme Court has now, in the two opinions that are 
the subject of the essays collected in this book, reversed the holdings of both 
the Ninth and the Second Circuits. Those opinions-Washington v Glucks-
berg30 and Vacca v Quill31-are described in these essays, 32 so I will not re-
view them here. These questions bring us up to the present and conclude 
our brief investigation of the historical and legal background to the Court's 
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decision in Glucksberg. There is, however, one more story to tell about 
Nancy Cruzan. After the Supreme Court ruled against her parents, they 
went back to the same judge in the same courtroom in Missouri. They said 
they had found "new evidence," the testimony of three of Nancy's friends 
who said she had told them she wouldn't want to "'live like a vegetable' on 
medical machines. "33 Once again, the judge authorized the Cruzans to have 
the hospital remove the feeding tube. This time, no one appealed the court 
order. In December of 1990, the hospital obeyed the Cruzans' instructions, 
and on December 26, Nancy Beth Cruzan died. 
Glucksberg 
It may be helpful to supplement this brief summary of the background of 
Glucksberg with a brief introduction to some of the principal issues that case 
raises. It has become truly hard to know what the law at the end of life ought 
to do in particular cases or where it ought to draw its lines in general. In some 
of these cases, the real question may be what constitutes death. In them, the 
issue is not whether to keep the patient alive, but whether the patient is 
already dead. In other cases, there are real and perplexing questions about 
the best medical course to follow even if the only goal is to prolong the pa-
tient's life. In yet other cases, there are strong reasons for deferring to the 
patient's preference even if that preference is for death. If a truly competent 
patient who is genuinely about to die and who is in unrelievable pain irrevo-
cably wishes to refuse "heroic" medical care, who are we to say he is wrong? 
Cases in all these categories, then, make it hard to say that life-sustaining 
treatment should never be withdrawn. The Ninth Circuit's description of 
one of the plaintiffs in Compassion in Dying makes this point painfully clear: 
Jane Roe is a 69-year-old retired pediatrician who has suffered since 
1988 from cancer which has now metastasized throughout her skele-
ton. Although she tried and benefitted temporarily from various treat-
ments including chemotherapy and radiation, she is now in the termi-
nal phase of her disease. In November 1993, her doctor referred her to 
hospice care. Only patients with a life expectancy ofless than six 
months are eligible for such care. 
Jane Roe has been almost completely bedridden since June of 
1993 and experiences constant pain, which becomes especially sharp 
and severe when she moves. The only medical treatment available to 
her at this time is medication, which cannot fully alleviate her pain. In 
addition, she suffers from swollen legs, bed sores, poor appetite, nau-
sea and vomiting, impaired vision, incontinence of bowel, and general 
weakness.34 
But here we meet the slippery-slope problem. "Slippery slope" is the 
phrase lawyers use to describe the following kind of argument: "There is 
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nothing wrong with doing A. A in itself is unobjectionable. But if you do A, 
you will soon wind up doing B, and B is objectionable. Therefore, you should 
not do A." The idea, of course, is that once you start off doing the desirable 
A, you find yourself helplessly sliding down a slope toward the undesirable B. 
But as I must often tell my students, slippery-slope arguments are, log-
ically, unconvincing. lf the first step is right, it is right even though the sec-
ond step is wrong. If the second step is wrong, then it simply should not be 
taken. But that should not prevent taking the first step, since there is no log-
ical reason the second step must be taken just because the first one was. In-
deed, there is a logical reason to stop before reaching the bottom, since the 
whole slippery-slope argument assumes that the top of the slope is very dif-
ferent from the bottom.35 
Logically, this refutation of the slippery-slope argument seems convinc-
ing. But as Justice Holmes memorably said, "The life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience." And the American experience of law at the 
end of life confirms, I think, the hazards of the slippery slope. For several 
reasons, this should not be surprising. First, slippery slopes work even if they 
logically shouldn't, partly because of the common law's method. The com-
mon law reasons from precedents. It asks whether each new case is essen-
tially the same as some precedent. If so, it is decided in the same way. But if 
you decide a series of cases in the same way because each case was almost 
the same as its predecessor, the end of the series may wind up quite far from 
the beginning. You may start at the top of the slope and, without realizing it, 
inch your way down to the bottom. 
Second, slippery slopes operate psychologically, not logically: "[T]hey 
work partly by domesticating one idea and thus making its nearest neighbor 
down the slope seem less extreme and unthinkable. "36 Yet a third reason we 
slide down slippery slopes is that there are people pushing us. Several or-
ganized groups ardently want to reform the law at the end of life. They are 
well aware that the public is afraid of the bottom of the slope; they have con-
sciously calculated how to move us by small steps down the slope. 
I have been suggesting that while slippery-slope arguments are not log-
ically convincing, they are practically persuasive. A quick review of the 
American experience shows just how far along the slope we have moved.37 
Up through at least the 1950s, and perhaps through the 1960s, the reform-
ers themselves framed the debate primarily in the very limited terms of 
(1) withholding or withdrawing (2) medical treatment from (3) competent 
adults who (4) suffered from a fatal illness, who (5) were in pain, and who 
(6) expressly refused treatment. 
Observe how far we have come. Neither Karen Ann Quinlan nor Nancy 
Beth Cruzan was, so far as anyone can know, in pain. Quinlan might have 
appeared to suffer from a fatal illness.38 Cruzan not only did not, but her life 
expectancy of thirty years was one of the arguments for causing her death. 
The issue in Quinlan was whether to withdraw medical care-a machine 
that helped her breathe. When Quinlan's father was asked about withdraw-
ing food and water, he was shocked, as doctors and laymen alike would have 
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been. But the Court in Cmzan barely noticed that the family wanted to with-
draw food and water, not medical care as it is usually understood. Most sig-
nificantly, neither Cruzan nor Quinlan refused treatment, and neither was 
competent to do so. Now voters in Oregon have twice adopted a referendum 
permitting physician-assisted suicide. And this describes only the movement 
of the law on the books. The law in action has also gone impressively far. It 
is hard to find out what goes on in the privacy of medical practice, but an im-
pressive hint is given by the American Hospital Association. It believes "that 
70 percent of the estimated 6,000 deaths that occur daily in the United 
States are somehow timed or negotiated with patients, family and doctors 
quietly agreeing on not using death-delaying technology."39 And doctors like 
Timothy Quill acknowledge that some physician-assisted suicide is already 
occurring. 40 
Of course, a slippery slope is not a problem unless the bottom of the 
slope is bad. What is it that opponents of assisted suicide fear? First, as 
Quinlan reminds us, doctors can make rnistakes.41 We cannot want patients 
to die who think they are mortally ill but who in fact would recover. Second, 
there is the danger that patients who would rather live will be led by social 
pressure-by the emotional and economic distress of their families, by the 
impatience of their doctors, by the social symbolism embodied in a "right to 
die"-to ask for death. Third is the risk that the slide down the slippery slope 
will continue to encompass the only two remaining steps-active voluntary 
euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia. 
Finally, we risk the lives of people who on some higher principle ought 
to live. Many of these will be ordinary people. But particularly jeopardized in 
this category will be people who are less than normal but not less than 
human. The American experience provides its share of disquieting impulses 
to end lives that observers think not worth living, or not worth supporting. 
Consider the words of the now-much-admired social reformer Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman, who in 1935 advocated "mercy killing" for '"incurable in-
valids', 'hopeless idiots', 'helpless paretics', and certain grades of criminals."' 
She "asserted that 'the dragging weight of the grossly unfit and dangerous 
could be lightened'" in this way "'with great advantage to the normal and 
progressive. "'42 
How can we summarize the lessons of the American experience with 
law at the end of life? Ultimately, I believe, it teaches us that we are con-
demned to uncertainty and sorrow. However deeply we think, we cannot 
know how to resolve every case. The strength ofreason is too weak. However 
hard we try, we cannot write rules that will cause all cases to be decided as 
we would wish. The power of language is too poor. We are trapped in our 
own ambivalence about what is good and our own inability to attain even 
what we know is right. 
Medical progress and the temper of our times have made the old rules 
unworkable. And surely rules that sentence the dying and the destroyed to 
prolonged and helpless agony can make the top of the slippery slope seem as 
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cruel as the bottom. But the new rules to which we are moving seem fraught 
with peril. In part, I believe we must accept that the law need not and can-
not by itself assume the whole social burden of these decisions. Some re-
sponsibility should and will be borne by patients themselves, by their doctors, 
and by their families. But I believe our best hope in this uncertainty lies in 
candid, open, and civil public discussion of an issue about which we will dis-
agree entirely, passionately, and irreconcilably. How else can we make wise 
policy about law at the end of life in the democratic society to which we are 
committed? 
I must close as I began, with a story. This is the true story of Carrie 
Coons, of Rensselaer, New York. This elderly lady fell into a persistent vege-
tative state. The doctors said her condition was hopeless and that she had no 
chance of recovery. Her eighty-eight-year-old sister asked a court to approve 
the removal of a feeding tube. The court agreed. Before the order could be 
carried out, however, her nurses asked her doctor to visit her. He found her 
awake and even alert. He described her legal problem to her. He asked what 
should be done. She replied, "These are difficult decisions." And she lapsed 
back into sleep.43 
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